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INTRODUCTION
California Evidence Code section 1108 allows prosecutors to
bring in evidence of the defendant’s past sexual misconduct, alleged
and otherwise, when they are currently on trial for a sex crime.1 As
such, section 1108 functions as a loophole to the California Evidence
Code rules against character evidence, reflecting how sex crimes are
treated differently than other offenses.
This Comment will examine whether section 1108 potentiates
miscarriages of justice. I will begin with a general discussion of
character evidence and the justifications for its general prohibition in
California’s criminal courts. I will discuss the sexual offense exception
to the rules against character evidence, including whether it is ethical or
even relevant to allow evidence of criminal sexual misconduct in the
prosecutor’s case-in-chief. Using a feminist lens, I will compare and
contrast section 1108 to other special sex crime evidence provisions,
such as California Evidence Code sections 1103 and 752, colloquially
knows as rape shield laws. Looking to the science and mythology of
sex crime propensity, I will examine whether section 1108 is actually
the right solution to prevent serial offenders from offending again, and
I will end with suggestions to narrow the breadth of section 1108 to
prevent due process violations in its utilization.
DEFINING CHARACTER EVIDENCE
According to California Evidence Code section 1101, character
evidence is not admissible in a California criminal jury trial to show
that a person acted in accordance with his or her character on a
Beyond the California Evidence Code’s
particular occasion.2
boilerplate,3 it is hard to actually pin down what character evidence is
because the definition of the word “character” is nebulous:
A survey of cases dealing with character evidence shows that
courts often attempt their own definitions. Some court-created
definitions of character include ‘[a] fixed disposition or tendency’ . . .
the ‘disposition or propensity to commit certain crimes, wrongs or
acts’; and ‘a person's tendency to act in a certain way in all varying
situations of life,’ among others. At best, these definitions are too
1. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108 (West 2016).
2. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101(a) (West 2016): Except as provided in this section and in
Sections 1102, 1103, 1108, and 1109, evidence of a person's character or a trait of his or her
character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific
instances of his or her conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on
a specified occasion.
3. Id.
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general, confusing, and vague. They do not distinguish, for example,
between a character trait on one hand, and a person's habit, mental
disorder, or sexuality on the other.4
WHY IS CHARACTER EVIDENCE GENERALLY EXCLUDED?
There are two primary reasons for the rule against character
evidence.5 First, the notion of character as predictive of actual
behavior is actually a kind of mythology.6 According to Professor
Mark Cammack, “while we typically use the notion of character for
organizing our perceptions of other people, generalizations about
character do not correlate as strongly with actual behavior as is
generally believed.”7 Professor Cammack further describes the
conundrum as follows: “[t]he problem is not one of logical relevance,
since evidence of a person’s generalized disposition has some
probative value on the issue of whether she behaved consistently with
that disposition.”8 Rather, the problematic aspect of character evidence
is its resulting prejudice.9
Jurors can overestimate the importance and predictive value of
character evidence, and subsequently give it more weight and
persuasive value than is merited.10 In the words of former Supreme
Court Justice Robert H. Jackson, “The inquiry is not rejected because
character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much
with the jury and to so over persuade them as to prejudge one with a
bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a
particular charge.”11 Justice Jackson further asserts that “[t]he
overriding policy of excluding such evidence, despite its admitted
probative value, is the practical experience that its disallowance tends
to prevent confusion of issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice.”12
The second main tenant in the prohibition against character
evidence of prior bad acts highlights the risk of jury misuse.13 There is
substantial concern that jurors may use evidence of character to decide
4. Barrett J. Anderson, Note, Recognizing Character: A New Perspective on
Character Evidence, 121 YALE L.J. 1912, 1922 (2012).
5. Mark Cammack, Using the Doctrine of Chances to Prove Actus Reus in Child
Abuse and Acquaintance Rape: People v. Ewoldt Reconsidered, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 355,
358 (1996).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Cammack, supra note 5.
11. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475–76 (1948).
12. Id. at 476.
13. Anderson, supra note 4, at 1929–930.
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whether a person should be convicted and punished, rather than base
their decision of the culpability of that person on the act that
precipitated the trial.14 As the backbone of our legal system is the
notion of guilt based on conduct rather than personal qualities or
attributes, the idea that guilt rests on the juror’s valuing of the character
of the person on trial is clearly improper.15
In attorney Celia McGuiness’ article for UC Hastings Law
Review, she describes her personal experiences with the dangers of
character evidence:
[I]t distracts the jury from judging the real, physical, direct and
circumstantial evidence of a crime, and instead leads to a judgment
of the defendant himself. In my practice, I have seen that jurors'
verdicts may, consciously or subconsciously, turn on whether or
not they liked the defendant. Jurors may acquit, not from an overt
desire to excuse someone they like, but rather from the natural
inclination to be more skeptical of evidence against a person whom
they consider worthy of protection. In the minds of jurors, the legal
presumptions of innocence and the burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt are often construed more strictly in favor of a
person who is considered a good person, or at least, not a bad one. 16

For the aforementioned reasons, under California Evidence
Code section 1101, character evidence is not admissible in the
prosecutor’s case-in-chief to show propensity. However, since the
1995 passage of California Evidence Code section 1108, character
evidence is admissible as evidence of propensity when prosecuting sex
crimes.17
BACKGROUND OF THE SECTION 1108 EXCEPTION
In 1995, the California State Legislature enacted Evidence Code
section 1108. As the California Supreme Court purports, “evidence of
a defendant's other sex offenses constitutes relevant circumstantial
evidence that he committed the charged sex offenses.”18 Under
California Evidence Code section 1108, in a sex crimes trial the
prosecutor is permitted to introduce evidence that the defendant has
committed other sex crimes in the past.19 There is virtually no limit on
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Celia McGuinness, Sliding Backwards: The Impact of California Evidence Code
Section 1108 on Character Evidence, Rape Shield Laws and the Presumption of Innocence,
9 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 97, 100 (1998).
17. Id. at 102.
18. People v. Falsetta, 21 Cal. 4th 903, 920 (1999).
19. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108(a) (West 2016): In a criminal action in which the
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the nature of the previous act which may be used.20 The defendant
need not have actually been convicted or even arrested of a past sex
crime; instead, the prosecutor can introduce evidence that he was
merely arrested in a case where charges were dropped, or that he
committed a sex crime for which charges were never filed.21 An
allegation is enough.22 Even gossip, in the form of reputation or
opinion, may be sufficient.23 Perhaps most critically, past acts need not
be similar to the charged offense as long as they are under the same
proscribed umbrella of sexual misconduct.24
Further, section 1108 differs from all other rules regarding
character evidence because it allows the introduction of the evidence in
the prosecution’s case in chief; the door for admissibility does not need
to be first opened by the defendant’s introduction of his good
character.25 The Assembly Digest of the bill states that “evidence
admitted under this new section would be subject to rational
assessment by a jury as evidence of the defendant’s disposition to
commit such crimes, and as evidence concerning the probability or
improbability that the defendant has been falsely or mistakenly
implicated in the commission of charged offense.”26 The author of the
bill, Senator James Rogan (R-Glendale), explains his motivation for the
development of section 1108:
Under current law, evidence that a particular defendant has
committed rape, acts of child molestation, or other sexual offense
against other victims is not necessarily admissible in a trial where
the defendant is being accused of a subsequent sexual offense. The
propensity to commit sexual offenses is not a common attribute
among the general public. Therefore, evidence that a particular
defendant has such a propensity is especially probative and should
be considered by [the trier] of fact when determining the credibility
of a victim’s testimony. This proposal will amend the Evidence
Code so as to establish, in sexual offense actions, a presumption of
admissibility for evidence that the defendant has committed similar

defendant is accused of a sexual offense, evidence of the defendant's commission of another
sexual offense or offenses is not made inadmissible by Section 1101, if the evidence is not
inadmissible pursuant to Section 352.
20. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108 (West 2016).
21. Id.
22. See id.
23. McGuinness, supra note 16, at 104.
24. See id. at 105.
25. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108 (West 2016).
26. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST, A.B. 882, 1995-96 Reg. Sess., (Cal.
1995).
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crimes on other occasions.27

Additionally, as with all evidence introduced in California
criminal trials, character evidence regarding past sex crimes may be
excluded under California Evidence Code section 352 if its value is
substantially outweighed by either the probability that it would take too
much time to present, or the risk that it would either cause undue
prejudice against the defendant, confuse the issues, or mislead the
jury.28 The court has the discretion to decide whether or not to exclude
sex crimes character evidence for one of these reasons.29
California Evidence Code section 1108 specifically makes twentyone offenses admissible,30 including pornography distribution offenses,
as well as violent acts.31 Eight of the offenses require no actual
physical contact.32 The Code allows the admission of such proclivities
as sadomaschochism, permitting evidence of acts "[d]eriving sexual
pleasure or gratification from the infliction of death, bodily injury, or
physical pain on another person.”33 Section 1108 broadly ends with a
catch-all provision for "[a]n attempt or conspiracy to engage in conduct
described in this paragraph.”34
DUE PROCESS DILEMMA
In People v. Falsetta, the California Supreme court unanimously
held that the section 1108 exception to the ban on character evidence
does not violate the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution.35
However, this conclusion contradicts the fundamental notions of due
process that motivated the exclusion of character evidence in the first
place,36 such as a right to a fair trial.37 Convictions based on a jury’s
perception, enabled by section 1108, that the defendant is a bad
27. McGuinness, supra note 16, at 103–04.
28. Id.; see also CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 2016): The court in its discretion may
exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its
admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of
undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.
29. Id.
30. CAL. EVID. CODE § l108 (West 2016); see also McGuinness, supra note 16, at 104.
31. CAL. EVID. CODE § l108 (d)(1)(A) (West 2016) (referring to, inter alia, conduct
prohibited by CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.2(b) (West 2016)); see also McGuinness, supra note
16, at 104.
32. CAL. EVID. CODE § l108 (d)(1)(A) (West 2016); see also McGuinness, supra note
16, at 104.
33. CAL. EVID. CODE § l108(d)(1)(E) (West 2016); see also McGuinness, supra note
16, at 104–05.
34. CAL. EVID. CODE § l108(d)(1)(F) (West 2016).
35. People v, Falsetta, 21 Cal. 4th 903, 907, 915–22 (1999).
36. See Michelson v. U.S., 335 U.S. 469, 475–76 (1948).
37. See McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378, 1384 (9th Cir. 1993).
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character sabotages the presumption of innocence and lessens the
state’s burden of proof.38
Facts should supersede speculation,
prejudice, and fear in criminal trials.39
Since the constitutionality of section 1108 under the Due
Process Clause is facially problematic, one would think that the United
States Supreme Court would address such policies head-on. However,
in Spencer v. Texas, regarding a Texas state habitual offender law
similar to section 1108, the Court held that utilizing prior convictions
does not offend the principles of due process.40 Even though the
United States Supreme Court expressed doubt regarding the scope of
the habitual offender law contested in Spencer,41 “it cited its traditional
hesitance to dictate rules of criminal procedure to the states as a reason
to refrain from finding that the Texas statutes violated due process.”42
According to Justice Benjamin Cardozo,43 “a state rule of law ‘does not
run foul of the Fourteenth Amendment because another method may
seem to our thinking to be fairer or wiser or to give a surer promise of
protection to the prisoner at bar.’”44 However, in Spencer, the evidence
of prior specific acts was admitted as proof of recidivism to prove the
defendant was a habitual offender, which, unlike character evidence, is
a standard method of evaluating defendants and is not limited to sex
offenders.45 Further, the court in Spencer considered prior convictions,
not the allegations or even gossip that can be admitted under section
1108 to prove uncharged prior bad acts.46
Although Spencer was decided decades before California’s
legislature passed section 1108, in his dissent and concurrence in
Spencer, Chief Justice Earl Warren points out issues directly relevant
to the code’s constitutionality: “Recidivist statutes have never been
thought to allow the State to show probability of guilt because of prior
convictions.”47 Relatedly, Justice Warren observed, “[t]he fact of prior
convictions is not intended by recidivist statutes to make it any easier
for the State to prove the commission of a subsequent crime.”48 He
38. McGuinness, supra note 16, at 113.
39. Id.
40. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 563–65 (1967).
41. McGuinness, supra note 16, at 113. “Chief Justice Warren and Justice Stewart both
agreed that the two-step trial method was ‘far superior’ to Texas’ method as a way to
decrease potential prejudice.” Id. at 113 n.117.
42. Spencer, 385 U.S. at 113.
43. Id. at 564.
44. Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
45. McGuinness, supra note 16, at 113–14.
46. Id. at 114 n.122.
47. Id. at 571 (Warren, C.J., dissenting and concurring).
48. Id.
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was in favor of striking statues like 1108 on pre-emption grounds,
claiming that they would violate the Due Process Clause.49
Whether or not a State has recidivist statutes on its books, it is well
established that evidence of prior convictions may not be used by
the State to show that the accused has a criminal disposition and
that the probability that he committed the crime currently charged
is increased. While this Court has never held that the use of prior
convictions to show nothing more than a disposition to commit
crime would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, our decisions exercising supervisory power over
criminal trials in federal courts, as well as decisions by courts of
appeals and of state courts, suggest that evidence of prior crimes
introduced for no purpose other than to show criminal disposition
would violate the Due Process Clause.50

Justice Warren further elaborates that using previous crimes for
propensity purposes sabotages the accused individual’s opportunity for
a fair trial, and is thus unconstitutional.51
Evidence of prior convictions has been forbidden because it
jeopardizes the presumption of innocence of the crime currently
charged. A jury might punish an accused for being guilty of a
previous offense, or feel that incarceration is justified because the
accused is a ‘bad man,’ without regard to his guilt of the crime
currently charged. Of course it flouts human nature to suppose that
a jury would not consider a defendant’s previous trouble with the
law in deciding whether he has committed the crime currently
charged against him. As Justice Jackson put it in a famous phrase,
“the naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by
instructions to the jury…all practicing lawyers know to be
unmitigated fiction.”52

Justice Warren would presumably recoil at laws like section 1108;
despite the claim by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that allowing
the evidentiary admission of prior specific crimes to show propensity
“is not a blank check entitling the government to introduce whatever
evidence it wishes, no matter how minimally relevant and potentially
devastating to the defendant.”53 The safeguards against this “blank
check” are contingent on the court’s judgment call on the highly

49. McGuinness, supra note 16, at 114.
50. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 572–74 (1967).
51. McGuinness, supra note 16, at 115.
52. Spencer, 385 U.S. at 575 (quoting Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453
(1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
53. United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001) (considering the
public policy behind similar federal rules).
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fraught topic of sex offenses, where even the most even-keeled judge
may harbor knee-jerk reactions, not to mention the political pressures
of reelection. Justice Warren points out that this “apparently plausible
syllogism”54 crumbles when the Court’s majority conclusion is not
actually comprised of the two premises:55
I believe the Court has fallen into the logical fallacy sometimes
known as the fallacy of the undistributed middle, because it has
failed to examine the supposedly shared principle between
admission of prior crimes related to guilt and admission in
connection with recidivist statutes. That the admission in both
situations may serve a vast purpose does not demonstrate that the
former practice justifies the latter any more than the fact that men
and dogs are animals means that men and dogs are the same in all
respects.56

Chief Justice Warren concluded his pointed dissent in Spencer
by lamenting that the majority of his peers on the bench were focused
on the recidivist statutes’ goals to the detriment of analyzing their
constitutionality.57 Likewise, courts face the same risks with section
1108.58 It is safe to surmise that judges want to convict sex offenders.59
The constitutional propriety of seeking convictions via prior specific
acts character evidence is less apparent.60 Since section 1108 character
evidence eases the burden on the prosecution and irreparably harms
any presumption of innocence,61 it creates an environment where an
innocent person is more likely to be convicted.62
Nevertheless, California Courts of Appeal have disavowed such
concerns in cases like People v. Fitch, where the defendant in a rape
trial challenged the use of section 1108 to admit evidence of his guilt in
an earlier rape.63 The holding in Fitch limited the scope of the Due
Process Cause to the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights, narrowly
defining the category of judicial actions that violate fundamental
fairness.64 In Fitch, California’s Third District Court of Appeal stated
that admitting evidence of prior specific sex crimes does not offend
“some principle of justice so rooted in traditions and conscience of
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

McGuinness, supra note 16, at 115.
Id.
Spencer, 385 U.S. at 578–79 (Warren, C.J., dissenting and concurring).
Id. at 569–71.
McGuinness, supra note 16, at 116.
Id.
Id.
See Spencer 385 U.S. at 571, 575 (Warren, J., dissenting and concurring).
Id.
See People v. Fitch, 55 Cal. App. 4th 172, 175–76 (1997).
Id. at 178–79.
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people as to be ranked as fundamental.”65 Courts defend this reasoning
by pointing out section 352’s balancing test as section 1108’s built-in
safeguard against the use of uncharged sex offenses in cases where its
admission could result in a fundamentally unfair trial.66
SECTION 352 BALANCING: DOES IT REALLY PREVENT MISCARRIAGES
OF JUSTICE?
Ostensibly, Evidence Code section 352 serves as a prophylactic
shield against the use of prior sex crimes under section 1108 if such
evidence would potentiate an unduly compromised trial.67 Section
1108 evidence is subject to exclusion under section 352’s balancing
test,68 which evaluates the probative value of evidence to ensure that it
will not be substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice.69
The California Supreme Court dubs section 352 “a realistic safeguard”
for the admission of sex offense evidence to show propensity.70 Rather
than admit or exclude every sex offense, trial judges must consider a
multiplicity of non-dispositive factors like nature, relevance, and
possible remoteness in time, the certainty of the offense’s commission,
whether it confuses, misleads, or distracts the jurors, its similarity to
the charged offense, its likely prejudicial impact on the jurors, the
burden on the defendant in defending against the uncharged offense,
and if there are any less prejudicial alternatives to its outright
admission, such as allowing some but not all of the other sex offenses,
or excluding irrelevant though inflammatory details surrounding the
offense.71
FEMINISTS AGAINST SECTION 1108
Even though section 1108 is supposed to help victims of sex
crimes, some feminist scholars believe it actually subverts the advances
made by rape shield laws for complainants in sex crimes.72 The
rationale for this conclusion is that the need for propensity evidence
facilitated by section 1108 reflects the attitude that a woman’s
credibility is insufficient to sustain a criminal complaint.73 Further,

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 179.
See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108(a) (West 2016).
People v. Chatman, 38 Cal. 4th 344 (2006) (citing CAL. EVID. CODE, § 352).
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108(a) (West 2016).
CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 2016).
People v. Falsetta, 21 Cal. 4th 903, 918 (1999).
Id. at 917.
McGuinness, supra note 16, at 98.
Id.

2017]

PRIOR BAD ACTS

529

section 1108 could compromise rape shield laws by making the sexual
character of the defendant take center-stage, which would seem to
make the sexual character of the victim more relevant by proxy.74
Enacted in the 1970s, sections 1103(c)75 and 78276 of the
California Evidence Code are commonly known as rape shield laws.77
The purpose of rape shields was to combat the societal tendency to
victim-blame that can infiltrate juror consciousness, particularly when
the victim may not adhere to normative standards of sexual virtue.78
Rape shield laws also contradict laws requiring corroboration of rape
accusations, because the latter convey that without a third party
vouching for her story, we cannot trust that a woman is telling the

74. See id.
75. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1103(c)(1)-(6) (West 2016):
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this code to the contrary, and except as
provided in this subdivision, in any prosecution under Section 261, 262, or 264.1 of the
Penal Code, or under Section 286, 288a, or 289 of the Penal Code, or for assault with intent
to commit, attempt to commit, or conspiracy to commit a crime defined in any of those
sections, except where the crime is alleged to have occurred in a local detention facility, as
defined in Section 6031.4, or in a state prison, as defined in Section 4504, opinion evidence,
reputation evidence, and evidence of specific instances of the complaining witness' sexual
conduct, or any of that evidence, is not admissible by the defendant in order to prove
consent by the complaining witness.
(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (3), evidence of the manner in which the victim was
dressed at the time of the commission of the offense shall not be admissible when offered by
either party on the issue of consent in any prosecution for an offense specified in paragraph
(1), unless the evidence is determined by the court to be relevant and admissible in the
interests of justice. The proponent of the evidence shall make an offer of proof outside the
hearing of the jury. The court shall then make its determination and at that time, state the
reasons for its ruling on the record. For the purposes of this paragraph, “manner of dress”
does not include the condition of the victim's clothing before, during, or after the
commission of the offense.
(3) Paragraph (1) shall not be applicable to evidence of the complaining witness' sexual
conduct with the defendant.
(4) If the prosecutor introduces evidence, including testimony of a witness, or the
complaining witness as a witness gives testimony, and that evidence or testimony relates to
the complaining witness' sexual conduct, the defendant may cross-examine the witness who
gives the testimony and offer relevant evidence limited specifically to the rebuttal of the
evidence introduced by the prosecutor or given by the complaining witness.
(5) Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to make inadmissible any evidence
offered to attack the credibility of the complaining witness as provided in Section 782.
(6) As used in this section, “complaining witness” means the alleged victim of the
crime charged, the prosecution of which is subject to this subdivision.
76. This section of the law says that it may be permissible to introduce evidence about
the accuser's sexual past that is used to challenge the accuser's credibility. CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 782 (West 2016).
77. Harriet R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A
Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 765 (1986); see also Peter M.
Hazelton, Rape Shield Laws: Limits on Zealous Advocacy, 19 AM. J. CRIM. L. 35, 36 (1991).
78. Hazelton, supra note 77, at 36–37.

530

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:57

truth.79 “This justification maintains that a woman is likely to make
false rape charges from shame or to protect her reputation after having
consensual sex; to shield another man who has made her pregnant;
from hatred; for blackmail; or for simple notoriety.”80 Further, in the
1970s, mainstream psychiatrists attributed false rape allegations “to the
fact that for some women it is better to be raped than ignored.”81
Although the corroboration requirement is now defunct, its
legacy “casts a shadow, in that the law still suggests that rape cases and
rape complainants occupy a separate category when it comes to
credibility.”82 Attorney and feminist scholar Susan Estrich asserts that
the corroboration requirement emerged in “response to a man’s
nightmarish fantasy of being charged with simple rape” and the
“institutionalization of the law’s distrust of women victims through
rules of evidence and procedure.”83
Accordingly, feminist legal scholars assert that section 1108 has
revitalized this notion that a women’s testimony cannot be relied upon
to convict on its own.84 This notion is reinforced by Senator Rogan in
the Public Safety Report: “Evidence that a particular defendant has
such a propensity (to commit sexual offenses) is especially probative
and should be considered by the trier of fact when determining
credibility of a victim’s testimony.”85 Therefore, one of the purposes
of section 1108 appears to be the admission of evidence concerning the
probability that the defendant has been falsely or mistakenly implicated
in commission of the charged offense, based on the defendant’s
history.86 The focus is not the defendant’s guilt as much as bolstering
or corroborating the woman’s credibility.87
Scholars suggest the admission of defendant’s propensity
evidence is unique to sex crimes because “in no other crime is the
victim’s testimony automatically suspect.”88 As such, “section 1108
79. See Donald J. Friedman, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not
Reform, 81 YALE L.J. 1365, 1367–70 (1972). Since the 1970s, rape corroboration laws have
since become defunct. McGuinness, supra note 16, at 107.
80. Id.
81. Friedman, supra note 79, at 1373 n.60.
82. Rosemary C. Hunter, Gender in Evidence: Masculine Norms vs. Feminist Reforms,
19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 127, 156 (1996).
83. Lisa R. Eskow, The Ultimate Weapon? Demythologizing Spousal Rape and
Reconceptualizing its Prosecution, 48 STAN. L. REV. 677, 694–95 (1996).
84. McGuinness, supra note 16, at 107.
85. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMM. REP., A.B. 882, 1995-96 Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 1995).
86. Id.
87. McGuinness, supra note 16, at 108.
88. Id. at 108.
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revives the corroboration requirement through the back door. It
perpetuates the myth that the victim’s credibility in sex cases is
categorically suspect.”89
Designed to protect the “categorically suspect” victim, rape shield
laws like California Evidence Code section 1103(c) disallow evidence
of prior sexual conduct to prove that the alleged victim consented.90
Section 782 requires a signed document attesting to the relevance of
the evidence and a private relevancy hearing without the jury present
before any evidence of the complainant’s prior sexual conduct can
come into evidence.91 And even with sworn proof of relevancy, section
782 evidence can be excluded if the court finds it more prejudicial than
probative.92 Further, the relevant evidence must pertain to credibility
rather than consent: “Great care must be taken to insure that this
exception to the general rule barring evidence of a complaining
witness' prior sexual conduct . . . does not impermissibly encroach
upon the rule itself and become a ‘back door’ for admitting otherwise
inadmissible evidence.”93 Thus, when rape shield laws emerged in the
1970s, neither the defense nor the prosecution could use each other’s
respective sexual character against one-another.94 When section 1108
was enacted in 1995, it tipped the sexual character balance scale out of
equilibrium, since the prosecution is now allowed to use evidence of
prior sex crimes to show the defendant’s propensity to commit the
charged sex crime.95 This is not to suggest that our society and our
legal system should not concern itself with sex crime recidivism, but to
illustrate the discrepancy between the evidence allowed in sex crimes
via section 1108 and similar laws and the admissible evidence for all
other violent crimes, which are generally subject to the restrictions on
evidence of prior specific acts to show propensity.96
THE SCIENCE AND MYTHOLOGY OF RECIDIVISM
California’s Supreme Court acknowledges that section 1108 is
intended to allow justices to consider the propensity of the defendant to

89. Id.
90. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1103(c)(1) (West 2016). This prohibition applies to conduct
with people other than the defendant; conduct with the defendant remains admissible under
section 1103(c)(3).
91. CAL. EVID. CODE § 782 (West 2016).
92. People v. Rioz, 161 Cal. App. 3d 905, 916 (1984).
93. Id. at 918–19.
94. McGuinness, supra note 16, at 102.
95. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108 (West 2016); see also McGuinness, supra note 16, at 102.
96. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101 (West 2016).

532

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:57

commit sex crimes.97 Section 1108 is predicated on the notion that “the
propensity to commit sexual offenses is not a common attribute among
the general public. Therefore evidence that a particular defendant has
such a propensity is especially probative.”98 However, at least one
analysis has found no definitive proof that prior bad acts are probative
of guilt in the current offense.99
Nevertheless, sexual character evidence may be a focus for many
jurors, and defendants may be convicted on this basis even when the
evidence would not otherwise merit a conviction.100
This is
particularly acute when the prior act was particularly reprehensible but
related only to the trial in that it was sexual. And the justification for
section 1108—that prior crimes evidence is probative—is not a
conclusion consistent with the results of some recidivism studies.101
One study from the Bureau of Justice compared recidivism across the
criminal spectrum and found that the recidivism rate for rape was
7.7%, compared to 31.9% for burglars and 19.6% for violent
robbers.102 Only homicide has a lower recidivism rate.103 These
statistics directly contradict the section 1108 proponents who believe
that prior sex crimes are probative of future guilt.
Further, there is evidence of some variation in recidivism rates
within the sex crime category itself104 and within different categories of
perpetrators within a given crime.105 For example, true pedophiles,
who have an exclusive sexual propensity towards children,106 are sure
to have much higher child sexual abuse recidivism rates in general than
situational child molesters, who do not necessarily prefer children:
“pedophilia [is] a mental abnormality that critically involves what a lay
person might describe as a lack of control. DSM-IV 571-572 (listing
as a diagnostic criterion for pedophilia that an individual have acted on,
or been affected by, “sexual urges” toward children).”107 In the 1997
97. People v. Falsetta, 21 Cal. 4th 903, 907 (1999).
98. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMM. REP., A.B. 882, 1995-96 Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 1995) (statement of Assemblyman James Rogan, author of A.B. 882).
99. McGuinness, supra note 16, at 109.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence in Sex Offense
Cases, 78 MINN. L. REV. 529, 572 n.182 (1994).
103. See id.
104. Keith Soothill, Sex Offender Recidivism, 39 CRIME & JUST. 145, 156–61, 203
(2010); see, e.g., R.K. HANSON & M.T. BUSSIERE, (1998). Predicting Relapse: A MetaAnalysis of Sexual Offender Recidivism Studies, 63 J. CONSULTING CLINICAL PSYCHOL.
348-62 (1998) (evaluating and comparing types of sexual offenses and recidivism rates).
105. Id. at 156–61.
106. See id.; see also Hanson & Bussiere, supra note 104, at 348-62.
107. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 414 (2002).
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Supreme Court case Kansas v. Hendricks, the Court described how the
defendant personifies the preferential child molester’s high risk for
recidivism: the defendant conceded that, “when he becomes ‘stressed
out,’ he cannot ‘control the urge’ to molest children.”108 The Court
goes on to discuss Hendricks' diagnosis as a pedophile, "which
qualifies as a “mental abnormality”: “[t]his admitted lack of volitional
control, coupled with a prediction of future dangerousness, adequately
distinguishes Hendricks from other dangerous persons . . .”109 Cases
like Hendricks’ exemplify how certain types of sex crimes have a
heavy, but not exclusive, overlap with medical psychopathy like
pedophilia or sexual sadism. However, detailed studies show that “sex
offenders referred for psychiatric assessment or treatment cannot be
considered as representative of all sex offenders.”110 Thus section 1108
paints all sex offenders with the broad brush of propensity when only
certain, relatively defined subsets within the category show a markedly
higher risk of recidivism. If a defendant is not within one of those
high-risk groups, it is much more likely that section 1108 would bring
into evidence information that would weigh heavy on the jury without
substantiation of its probative value. In addition to the heightened
propensity for recidivism of the preferential sex offender, the age of the
offender is another measurable variable that directly correlates to
repeat offenses.111 Thus the admission of a young defendant’s previous
sex offense under California Evidence Code section 1108 would be
more probative of present guilt than it would of a much older
defendant, particularly if the past incident was distant in time from the
present charge.
From extensive data and meta-analysis, “the
understanding is that there is an inverse relationship between sexual
offenders’ age at the time of their release from incarceration and their
sexual recidivism risk.”112
REMEDIES
Non-Character Compromises: How About Habit?
Section 1108 is an unnecessary tool. There is no per se ban on
admitting evidence of a defendant’s previous actions.113 Accordingly,
even with section 1101’s ban on character evidence, prior sex crimes
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 (1997).
Id.
Soothill, supra note 104, at 158.
Id. at 163–64.
Id. at 164.
Cammack, supra note 5, at 360.
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can theoretically come into evidence as long as they are admitted for
non-propensity purposes.114 The constitutional ambiguities of section
1108’s exception to the ban on character evidence could be avoided if
section 1108 was supplanted by pre-existing mechanisms for admitting
the same types of evidence. For example, before section 1108 and its
federal counterpart’s delineated exceptions to the ban on character
evidence, courts in sex crime trials admitted evidence of the
defendant’s prior acts “to show a passion or propensity for unusual and
abnormal sexual relations.”115 In other words, courts could admit
evidence that past criminal perversions were habitual and thus
admissible under California Evidence Code section 1105.116 As such,
habit evidence could replace section 1108 as a more precise means to
admit prior bad acts that would seem more conducive to due process,
since the offenses would have to closely parallel the instant case in
order to show a habit.117
The difference between character and habit can be described as
follows:
Character is a generalized description of a person's disposition, or
of the disposition in respect to a general trait, such as honesty,
temperance or peacefulness. Habit, in the present context, is more
specific. It denotes one's regular response to a repeated situation.
If we speak of a character for care, we think of the person's
tendency to act prudently in all the varying situations of life—in
business, at home, in handling automobiles and in walking across
the street. A habit, on the other hand, is the person's regular
practice of responding to a particular kind of situation with a
specific type of conduct. Thus, a person may be in the habit of
bounding down a certain stairway two or three steps at a time, of
patronizing a particular pub after each day's work, or of driving his
automobile without using a seatbelt. The doing of the habitual act
may become semi-automatic.118

Accordingly, habit evidence is considered more reliable than
character evidence.119 The relative precision of habit is oppositional to
the breadth of section 1108, where a rape of a middle-aged woman ten
years before the trial could potentially come as character evidence in a

114. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1995).
115. 1 McCormick § 162 (1952).
116. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1105 (West 2016): Any otherwise admissible evidence of habit
or custom is admissible to prove conduct on a specified occasion in conformity with the
habit or custom.
117. Id.
118. 1 McCormick § 195 at 574–75.
119. See FED. R. EVID. 406 advisory committee’s note.
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child molestation case.
Perhaps a Plan to Prevent Prejudice?
In addition to replacing section 1108’s propensity evidence with
the more tailored section 1105 habit evidence, there are other noncharacter mechanisms that are better tailored to the fair admission past
misconduct. One common example is to admit past acts for the noncharacter purpose of showing a plan or design.120 Evidence of prior
similar acts can be admitted under plan or design if it is probative of
case specifics:121 “the number of events must be shown to be
significantly more numerous than would be expected in the absence of
design.”122 Further, the defendant’s uncharged misconduct and the
charged offense are sufficiently similar to support the inference that
they are manifestations of a common design or plan.”123 Here, the
jurors are not being asked to conclude that the defendant acted in a
particular manner because of the defendant’s inherent nature towards a
certain kind of criminality.124 Rather, they are instructed to draw
conclusions from an existing plan that would include acts both charged
and uncharged.125 Unlike section 1108’s showing of character or
propensity for sexual criminality, evidence showing plan would seem
more focused and material:
It is reasonable to infer from evidence showing that the defendant
has committed a series of similar crimes that she has settled on a single
technique for committing that crime, either because she has had
success with the technique or because using the same technique will
economize on imaginative effort.126
Although evidentiary use of prior bad acts by a defendant is
undoubtedly unfavorable to the accused, the non-character means of
admission are more focused and precise, and their utilization instead of
section 1108 would reduce the prosecutorial free-for-all that skirts the
limits of due process.127
Sever the Shield
More controversially, remedying the disparity in reciprocity
120. For commonly recognized non-character uses of uncharged misconduct evidence,
see 1 McCormick § 190.
121. Cammack, supra note 5, at 362.
122. Id. at 389.
123. People v. Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th 380, 401–02 (1994).
124. Cammack, supra note 5, at 362.
125. Id.
126. Cammack, supra note 5, at 372.
127. Id.
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may mediate the disparate prejudice wrought by propensity evidence
against the defendant.128 In other words, if the defendant can have past
uncharged sexual behavior and misconduct used against him, perhaps
the “rape shield”129 should be lifted off of the complaining witnesses.130
Reciprocity in “digging up dirt” on the sexual predilections of both the
complaining witness and accused would seem more congruent to
standards of judicial balance.131 In Wardius v. Oregon,132 the United
States Supreme Court recognized the right to reciprocity was built into
due process: to “speak to the balance of forces between the accused and
his accuser.”133
The reciprocity requirement allows the defendant to enjoy rights
equivalent to the prosecution in regards to the presentation of
evidence.134 When a defendant is subject to character evidence under
section 1108, justifying the exclusions of rape shield statutes because
of governmental interest in protecting a complainant's privacy
Privacy should not
unreasonably disadvantages the defense.135
outweigh the due process or the interests of justice in admitting
relevant evidence.136 The California Constitution does guarentee a
right of privacy; however, the interest in due process for one accused
should still outweigh a constitutional guarentee. That the defendant
stands to lose so much should preclide shutting the door to helpful and
possibly exculpatory information.
Reciprocity should also apply to the usage of character
evidence.137 In People v. Hansel, the California Supreme Court stated
that required reciprocal pretrial discovery helps defendants to present
their defense.138 Keeping in line with the precedent of reciprocity from
of Hansel and Wardius, section 1108 should theoretically open the
door to defense attorneys seeking to introduce a complainant's sexual
history.139

128. See McGuinness, supra note 16, at 118.
129. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 782 (West 2016).
130. See McGuinness, supra note 16, at 119.
131. David Haxton, Comment, Rape Shield Statutes: Constitutional
Unconstitutional Exclusions of Evidence, WIS. L. REV. 1219, 1256 (1985).
132. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
133. Id. at 474.
134. McGuinness, supra note 16, at 118.
135. Id. at 119.
136. Haxton, supra note 131, at 1259.
137. McGuinness, supra note 16, at 119.
138. People v. Hansel, 1 Cal. 4th 1211, 1221 (1992).
139. McGuinness, supra note 16, at 119.
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CONCLUSION
Section 1108 will lead to injustice for someone—the question is
whether it “will [] be women or the accused?”140 It seems like there are
only two viable options to bring due process back to equilibrium: either
cease the admission of propensity evidence to secure the conviction of
sex offenders, or relinquish rape shield laws, making women less
secure, but assuring that the scales of justice are more evenly
weighted.141

140. Id.
141. Id.

